Part II: Physical Statements

       It is often the case in a philosophical, political, or other debate that two people both have physical ideas but disagree on which one meets a certain word. For example, one philosopher has associated the idea "The action which makes the most people happiest" with the word "right." And another philosopher has associated "The action which makes the choosing individual happiest" with the word "right."

       To analyze this scenario we must first clarify. Let's take the statement "What makes the most people happiest is always right." There are two possible situations:

      Situation I: The speaker of the statement simply means "When I make the noise 'right' or write the sequence of letters 'right' I mean to refer to the course of action which makes people happiest and I acknowledge that others may intend something differently when they make the same noise."
       In this situation both of these philosophers are making testable and "physical" statements. They do not disagree. The significance of an action being "right" will depend on what the particular speaker is referring to with that word.
 
     Situation II: The speaker already refers to an idea when saying "right" and is associating a correlation between this previous idea and the new one (i.e. the action which makes the most people happiest). In this situation neither philosopher is necessarily saying something physical. It is up to the individual philosopher to, if he wishes to motivate a rational person, prove his or her statement is true and "physical."
      Either at least one philosopher will be wrong [and therefore unable to prove his point], the two philosopher's statements will be logically equivalent, the two philosophers will be referring to different previous ideas, or they will both be right (in the above example this would be true if self-interest always necessarily meant the good of the majority).

[If you contend that there are "right" and "wrong" definitions of words then your concerns are addressed on the variability of language page.]

      Let us expand on the third option: the two philosophers are referring to two different historical ideas. How does one resolve this discrepancy? Assume one philosopher can prove that by one historical definition of right that his statement correlates with what is right while the other philosopher can prove by a different historical definition of right that his statement correlates with what is right. This situation is situation I with a simple twist.

      In situation I, no matter how many twists, the philosophers do not disagree. They are speaking of differing ideas that only share a sound. These differing ideas will have differing conclusions and differing methods of being proven. These two philosophers will come to identical conclusions (possibly stating them in conflicting sentences) in that their physical predictions will be identical.

      Imagine an individual declares that "That which is right is that which maximizes the life-span of my cat," and more specifically intends to convey the case of situation I. How does one differentiate between significance of an action being right by the cat usage and another usage? Why is a statement ever significant (relevant to a human's choice) ?

Part Three: Applicability and Motivation